287

NIOSH/NCI Study of Exposure to Diesel Exhaust in Underground Minesan Industry Perspective
Christopher J. Pritchard P.E.
Senior Mine Engineer
Tg Soda Ash, Inc.
Granger, WY, 82934
USA

ABSTRACT
In 1992, the National Institute For Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) initiated a study, funded by the National Cancer
Institute (NCI), to evaluate the health effects, if any, involving underground miners exposure to diesel exhaust. An industry
organization, the Methane Awareness Research Group (MARG) already in place to respond to gassy mine related issues, was
redirected to work with diesel concerns. In 1995, NIOSH released a draft protocol and feasibility assessment, indicating its
intent to initiate s study at 14 underground mines, some of which were operated by MARG members. After considerable debate on the study protocol, in-mine industrial hygiene studies were begun in December, 1997 and expected to end in early
1999.
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INTRODUCTION
The study is a collaborative venture between NIOSH and
NCI, with NCI providing funding. The purpose is to determine if there is an association between lung cancer and diesel exhaust and if mortality from any cause other than lung
cancer is elevated. In addition, a retrospective, cohort mortality study, a nested case~ontrol study and a study of biomarkers is also proposed, regardless of the results of the
initial diesel study (Cole, et al., 1995).
The study will involve approximately 8200 employees of
10 non-metal mines where diesel exposures have been
common and other confounding effects such as coal dust,
radon and silica have been low.
The MARG group was formed in 1994 to address common gassy mine issues-primarily related to underground
salt, potash and trona. Initial interests were proposed
changes to gassy mine regulations (30 CFR, Part 57, Subpart T), last open break and bleeder entry definitions. When
the NIOSH/NCI diesel study began in 1995, the existing
organization involved many of the mines included in the
study. MARG efforts were redirected to address this issue.
MARG was initially involved in commenting on the
1995 NIOSH/NCI diesel study protocol. This was a group
effort, combining MARG technical staff, legal counsel and

nationally recognized experts in the area of industrial hygiene, diesel emissions and academia. MARG members and
experts took part in public hearings and submitted detailed
comments regarding what MARG felt were serious deficiencies in the protocol.
Participating with NIOSH in commenting on the study
protocol did not yield results that the group felt were conducive to defining the effect of diesel exhaust on underground
miners, our employees. In fact, MARG's recommendations,
many of which pointed out serious deficiencies in the study
protocol, were ignored by NIOSH. Due to this lack of cooperation, MARG felt it must resort to other avenues to assure
a good protocol and study. Tlris has resulted in litigation
against NIOSH that is still in progress and will be discussed
in detail later.

DIESEL STUDY!TIMELINE (Atfield, 1996)
The study was projected to take seven years, but since the
following schedule was drawn up, protocol revision and
related activities in Year 1 have taken two years to complete, resulting in an eight year schedule.
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Year 1 (and 2)
Complete NCI!DCE Board of Scientific Counselors Review;
Complete protocol development;
Complete NIOSH internal review;
Complete NCI Technical Evaluation of Protocol Review;
Complete NIOSH Peer review;
Meet with scientific advisory panel and all interested parties;
Initiate OMB and IRB clearances.
Year3
Begin microfilming records at off-site location and mines;
Begin coding and entering data;
Initiate Industrial hygiene (lli) surveys at mine sites;
Begin mortality follow-up;
Identify participating mines and miners for the biomarker
study.
Year4
Complete microfilming at mines and off-site locations;
Begin acquiring death certificates, and coding and keypunching;
Complete lli surveys;
Complete coding and entering of personal and lli data;
Collect biologic samples and corresponding lli samples.
Year 5
Complete mortality follow-up;
Continue to acquire death certificates, coding,
Identify next of kin of cases;
Select controls;
Complete biologic sample analyses and data analysis, and
notify workers of biologic sampling results;
Complete analysis of IH data.
Year6
Complete acquisition of death certificates, coding, and keypunching;
Complete telephone interviews for case-control study;
Estimate worker exposure;
Prepare master computer files for analysis;
Review biomarker findings, interpret results, and prepare
reports for publication;
Meet with advisory panel and other interested parties regarding biomarker study findings.
Year7
Conduct cohort data analyses;
Conduct case-control data analyses.
Year8
Review epidemiologic findings and interpretation of results;
Meet with advisory panel and other interested parties regarding epidemiologic findings;
Prepare and submit papers for publication;

Complete worker notification
INITIAL 1995 STUDY PROTOCOL
The initial 1995 protocol was reviewed for MARG and
submitted to NIOSH by a group of medical and industrial
hy-giene experts (Cole, et al., 1995). A note about industry
con-sultants: Standard beliefs, promoted by media and other
special interest groups, are that any and all industry retained
consultants are paid to corroborate industry viewpoints.
MARG realized that our purpose was only as credible as the
people speaking for ~ which led MARG to retain the best
experts.
The debatable corollary to this is that all Government
entities have only the public interest at heart It is difficult
for industry to overcome this inherent government advantage in public or in court. Recent experience is that it is not
deserved or earned.
MARG experts submitted the following and additional
comments, of the 1995 Protocol to NIOSH's peer review
committee: "The proposed NCI-NIOSH study offers opportunities to provide further information about the relation
between exposure to diesel exhaust and risk of lung cancer.
The study's strengths derive from the moderately large size
of the cohort and resultant expectation of over 100 lung
cancers, the wide range of diesel exposures, and the reported
low levels of exposures to radon and other known occupational causes of lung cancers. However, there are a number
of serious limit-at ions that may hinder the evaluation of the
role of diesel e:\.'J)Osure in cancer risk As is often the situation in any single epidemiologic study, even though the investigation may pro-vide information to help clarify the
health effects of diesel exposure, the inherent limitations
may preclude a definitive assessment of an association at the
study's end."
Additional comments questioned previous diesel studies
that have shown mixed to slightly positive results in the area
of lung cancer. Nauss (1998) states "The epidemiologic
data are consistent in showing weak associations between
exposure to diesel exhaust and lung cancer." Because of
this fme line, it is imperative that the NIOSH/NCI study use
the most meticulous, defensible techniques available to defme the results with the utmost confidence; most importantly, because of the potential far-reaching effects on the
operation of the MARG mines and ultimately - the entire
mining industry.
A major concern is NIOSH' s method to allow fot past
occupational exposures. Due to the mobility of mining employees, (confirmed by NIOSH later during on-site industrial surveys) many miners work at different types of mines
in their careers and have encountered multiple exposures to
diesel exhaust, silica, radon, and possibly asbestos that will
be impossible to quantify. This is a variable that is dependant on prior job history records which are often incomplete
and the individuals modeling this history will need to use
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subjective judgement. This will introduce a high degree of
variability.
NIOSH also expects to recreate a history of all past diesel exposures for the working life of the employee, cumulative as well as time specific. Some of the included MARG
comments are: "there is the potential for substantial imprecision in the estimates of amount of diesel exposure", "The
estimates for each employee depend upon a series of assumptions (e.g., that all employees with job x in year y experienced z amount of diesel exposure) that are not possible
to confirm and can, at best, be only approximately true.", "it
must be recognized that actual area and personal exposure
measurements are missing for the large majority of years the
mines were in operation, that current levels may correlate
imperfectly with historical levels, and that area estimates
may correlate imperfectly with historical levels.", "The
compounding of potential errors in each of these steps may
result in considerable error in the estimate of total diesel
exposure for and individual worker. This aspect of the reliability of the exposure assessment is not addressed in the
proposaf' (Cole, eta!. , 1995) (emphasis added).
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"The number of samples planned for collection is inadequate considering the changing environment in a mine."
"The HEZ''(Homogeneous Exposure Zone)"/job dictionary in this case is an act of faith, not science and, results can
be totally misleading."
"It is assumed that with one baseline estimate the complete historical exposure can be constructed for each individual. This is not a defensible approach."
MARG members provided input to the proposed protocol
and had raised many serious questions that needed to be
addressed. All of the comments had direct bearing on the
reliability of the results of the study. As shown, there were
not just a few minor comments, but many major differences
of opinion that could effect the study. In the final 1996
Protocol, essentially all ofMARG's constructive criticisms
were ignored. Without basing the study on good science,
defendable conclusions cannot be obtained.

MARG DIESEL STUDY EFFORTS
Peer Review Committee

Also, from the Health Effects Institute (Nauss, 1998), "Diesel engine emissions have changed dramatically over the
last 30 years because of improvements in engine teclmology, emissions controls, and fuel formulation." "As a result,
characterizations of modem-day diesel exhaust cannot be
used to estimate past exposures, nor can they be used to
reliably to project future emission profiles."
Some other comments from Cole, eta/. ;
"The potential for information bias, especially for questionnaire items such as medical history, asbestos e~"})osure, and
several other factors, needs to be addressed."
"The biomarker study appears to be a study in pursuit of
an explanation for a problem that is not known to exist. The
rationale for this study is weak, in fact, largely irrelevant.
Tllis study should be eliminated."
"The rationale for the use of elemental carbon as the
primary surrogate of diesel exhaust particulate is Reference
96 (Draft Protocol), an unpublished Coordinating Research
Council Report by D.P. Fowler dated 1985. Thus, the major reliance for this study on this unpublished, non-peer reviewed document appears to this reviewer to need additional
justification by the investigators."
"However, it is far more complex to extrapolate today's
results from earlier times because diesel engines and fuels
are very different today from even five years ago. How will
these technological improvements in engines/fuels be incorporated into modeling of emissions?"
"Decades of industrial hygiene experience indicate that
personal samples rather than area samples provide more
reliable measures of worker exposure .... Area sampling
should not receive primary emphasis."

The NIOSH peer review advisory panel approved the final
protocol in the fall of 1996 without the support of MARG
and the affected study mines.

Lawsuit
With the prospect of NIOSH arriving at the study mines to
begin sampling, and the belief the 1996 protocol as written
would not result in a good study to adequately determine
diesel effects, MARG took NIOSH to court. The lawsuit
was filed based on the following issues:
NIOSHhas:
( 1) eliminated participation on the peer review advisory
committee by the affected industry and labor groups;
(2) the peer review panel violated the Federal Advisory
Committee (FACA) Act~
(3) ignored the comments of world renowned scientists
seeking to improve the study; and
(4} proposed a high risk notification program at the study's
conclusion for past and current employees, of alleged
increased risks (anything above 1.0) based on policies
and procedures that were rejected by Congress when it
defeated the High Risk Notification bill because they
would result in wlfounded public concerns and baseless
litigation claims.
In short, rather than cure these problems and conduct this
important study cooperatively, NIOSH continues to insist on
flawed procedures and policies that shut out stakeholders.
This creates a probability of invalid scientific results, wastes
millions of taxpayer dollars, unduly burdens industry and
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could result in public paranoia of diesel engines, without
sound evidence of a health risk.
On October 18, 1996 MARG filed a lawsuit to block the
use of the September 23, 1996 NIOSH protocol as site visits
were planned to AKZO or Morton salt facilities in early
December. The use of the FACA defense alleged that the
peer review group was in fact a federal advisory committee
convened to develop government policy and was not legally
chartered. Some FACA requirements are that a committee
must be fairly balanced in terms of membership of the
groups affected by the committee. Concerned labor union
and mining company officials were not allowed significant
input or balanced representation with the NIOSH personnel
on the committee.
The judge granted a preliminary injunction November
11, 1996 to prevent the peer review panel from meeting to
adopt the 1996 version of the study protocol. The judge held
that the committee was subject to FACA and could not proceed until properly chartered. The judge issued an order
verifying the preliminary injunction on January 7, 1997.
Involvement of the NIOSH Board of Scientific Counselors
NIOSH countered by reverting to the flawed original 1995
pre-comment protocol and had the NIOSH Board of Scientific Counselors (BSC) review the protocol at their January
14, 1997 meeting. Even though the 1995 protocol was acknow-ledged as flawed by NIOSH and further revised to the
1996 version, the BSC endorsed the old 1995 protocol with
no substantive comments. Tills validates MARG's contention that the purpose of the BSC was to rubber stamp
NIOSH's program. It seemed NIOSH was more interested
in keeping to its schedule and priorities than good research.
MARG requested an expedited hearing for the court to
enjoin the BSC from meeting January 14, 1997 to consider
the protocol, which was denied. At the request of the Court,
negotiations continued with NIOSH attorneys and staff
during February to attempt to settle study concerns. When
no substantive concessions were made, MARG filed an appeal to the court's ruling that the BSC met the requirements
ofFACA and could review the protocol.
. It is important to note, government agencies that establish advisory committees are required by FACA law to meet
certain requirements as to filing requirements, charters and
statements of purpose, balance of membership, conflict of
interest, etc. Tins is to assure responsible management of
government funds and that the committees produce results
that are in accordance to their expertise, and balanced in
viewpoint.
Because of information discovered regarding the BSC
advisory committee, lawsuit was e~rpanded to the include
the following:
TI1e BSC was not lawfully established at that time because NIOSH failed to file any charter with the House
Committee on Education and the Workforce, which over-

sees NIOSH. When it met on January 14, 1997, the charter
had not been renewed for over four years, expiring February
3, 1993. According to FACA and GSA rules, the committee
is not allowed to meet or act (emphasis added) until the
charter has been filed. Ironically, to provide a resemblance
of credibility to the protocol, NIOSH did an "end-run"
around the court order banning the use of the 1996 protocol.
NIOSH transferred the protocol which had been generated
by a non-F ACA approved committee to the presently uncharterd, expired FACA BSC. The peer review committee
had no "license plate on the car", the BSC committee had an
"expired license plate"- can't drive either one -legallyf
Also, the BSC had never before been called upon to peer
review a scientific proposal and this function was not included in its charter, therefore, that function is out of its
jurisdiction and it therefore could not legally review the
NIOSH protocol.
FACA requires membership to be fairly balanced and
contain a cross-section of those affected. There were no
members on the protocol committee from the mining community, mining labor groups or those experienced in diesel
exhaust carcinogenicity research. NIOSH did not have a
required management plan for the BSC to assure a balanced
membersllip. This does not providing the highest level of
peer review of the protocol, as required by Congress (Committee on Appropriations, 1996).
NIOSH appointed BSC members who violated Health
and Human Services (HHS) Advisory Committee Standards
(intended to provide balance and neutrality of Committees)
due to: (a) members' overwhelming reliance on $4 million
of HHS grants~ (b) prior HHS employment or HHS fellow
awards~ (c) joint research activities with HHS personnel and
each other; and (d) the conduct of negotiations for federal
employment (with agencies directly affected by the diesel
study) at the same time they reviewed the study as a BSC
nominee and member (Leathers, 1997).
On April 28, 1997 the court ruled against MARG and
refused to enjoin the BSC from meeting and reviewing the
protocol. MARG submitted a motion for reconsideration.
The lawsuit was continued in the U. S. Court of Appeals
in December, 1998. The judge had ruled that by transferring
the protocol to a FACA committee, NIOSH had adhered to
the letter of the law. MARG contended that the protocol was
flawed due to the above reasons and should be thrown out.
Two of the three judges hearing the appeal seemed interested in having a more strict compliance with the express
terms of FACA (MARG, 1998). MARG expects a ruling
early in 1999.
MARG VISION OF THE DIESEL STUDY
MARG developed a policy (MARG, 1997) toward the study
that was presented to NIOSH, NCI and Congressional staff.
MARG believes that only by instituting these changes,
would a definitive study arise that would truly answer the
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question which all parties are searching for - does diesel
exhaust cause an increased risk of lung cancer in miners?
Funding for the proposed seven-year study to determine
whether or not diesel exhaust causes lung cancer by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
and the National Cancer Institute (NCI) is contingent upon:
(1) approval of the protocol by NCI's (Note: not the previous NIOSH BSC) Board of Scientific Counselors;

(2) peer review of the protocol pursuant to NCI procedures
used for extramural study grants and ongoing review of
the study progress, data, analysis of data and draft reports by a qualified group of scientific, mining and diesel experts, pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and that is composed of three members
nominated by labor, three members nominated by industry and three members nominated by the above;
(3) study implementation, in phases, beginning with an
initial three year phase to determine: (a) if a statistically
significant increased risk of lung cancer is caused by
diesel exhaust exposure conducted by the NIOSH Research Division in Pittsburgh, P A and the NIOSH Research Division in Spokane, W A (utilizing former Bureau of Mines personnel), (b) the validity and variability of proposed diesel sampling devices and analytical
procedures, and (c) the feasibility of assessing diesel
exposures over the past 20 years;
(4) data and analysis sharing (without personal identifiers)
with interested parties, as it is collected and prepared to
permit early independent review; and
(5) review by the same Advisory Committee of any proposed publications and risk notification to individuals
or the media, to assure findings based on scientific,
biological plausibility and validity based on statistically
significant findings.

Comments on the June 1997 Protocol
After the April, 1997 meeting of the NIOSH Board of Scientific Counselors, which the diesel study was approved by
an organization without any mining or diesel epidemiological expertise, the MARG scientists made the following observations (MARG, 1997):
"With respect to the Exposure Assessment, NIOSHINCI
responses in the protocol are cosmetic."
"It is clear to me that certain members of the Board of
Scientific Counselors have permitted their loyalty to the
agency to cloud their scientific judgement when their comments on the proposed study refer to the exposure assessment as "state of the art". The exposure assessment is
predicated on an enormous hypothetical retrospective expo-
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sure framework based on current measurements and a limited point-in-time (in the 1970's) anchor to the past thirty
years."
"With the procedures described, attainment of reliable
individual miner exposure assignments or even group assignments is not possible. Any further effort to use such
assignments in a dose-response relationship will be based on
enormous personal judgement, and not a defensible result of
scientific research."
"I regret being placed in the roll of being so critical of an
obviously well-meaning effort, but we strengthen our agencies and improve our understandings of occupational disease
by supporting the best research we can mount in a period of
scarce resources. This is not the best research one can
mount today to address the potentiol health impacts of
chronic exposure to diesel exhaust." (Emphasis added).
At the July 23, 1997 BSC meeting, while several members of the committee expressed support for MARG's position, and concern that NIOSH had not addressed valid issues, the BSC Chainnan pushed for and obtained a unanimous vote approving the protocol "with the concerns
noted". At this time the court had not yet ruled on MARG 's
motion for recon-sideration.
The new protocol did not change the basic design of the
original. Additional comments on the cohort study; casecontrol study and exposure assessment was raised, to no
avail. Further serious questions were brought up on the use
of elemental carbon and its lack of correlation to airborne
particulate in relation to some recent Australian and German
surveys.

INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE IN-MINE SURVEYS
Given that the protocol had been approved and was going to
be used by NIOSH regardless, MARG members began preparing for the upcoming on-site visits. Planning concentrated on detennining the level that MARG would replicate NIOSH's data collection for validity testing, access
rights to employee data files, logistics of taking care of the
NIOSH employees facility and transportation needs. Bids
were ac-quired for an outside consultant to take in-mine
parallel samples for MARG and make arrangements for
these indi-viduals to receive MSHA training
There was some initial difficulty in obtaining information from NIOSH regarding the type of equipment to be
used and procedures utilized in the study. Some of the sampling equipment was unproven and prototypical in nature
and would be difficult to obtain. Continued correspondence
with NIOSH centered on previous issues that were unresolved and contra-dicted with MARG's proposed study
goals noted above.
The first NIOSH mine visit was in December, 1997 at
the IMC Carlsbad (potash) and Mississippi Potash operation
for the purpose of familiarization and requests for documents. As always, the first study site had a few problems,
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with both parties learning the routine and having certain
equipment problems. NlOSH had some problems with the
NOx Palmes tubes/dosimeters and sampling pump failures.
A surprising develpment was the NIOSH request for IMC to
rate job exposures from 1 to 5 based on their subjective
judgement!
The second visit was to Mississippi Potash, New·Mexico
- February, 1998. MARG decided to change sampling to
include variable measurements over time and space instead
of duplicating NIOSH samples. Samples would also be
taken during other times of the year to allow for environmental variability, such as seasonal temperature and humidity effects. The company also required a search warrant to
access em-ployee records to prevent the mine operator from
being sued for allowing NIOSH access to individual personnel files.
NIOSH scheduled a public meeting April 17, 1998 to
bring interested parties up to date on the diesel study, but
cancelled. A potential meeting has been discussed for the
spring of 1999. NIOSH has stated in its early peer review
committee that it was necessary to have regular public
meetings for labor and company officials to be informed on
the survey progress. This was evidently just meant for public consumption, as it has not happened.

Results at this time are very preliminary. NIOSH is in process of entering worker records and some of the initial mine
data js being analyzed. According to NIOSH, draft data
analysis showed excellent correlation between diesel surrogates respirable elemental carbon (EC), CO, NO and NCh.
This gives NIOSH confidence that generation of past exposure to diesel particulate levels can be modeled.
Preliminary analysis of MARG data for the first two
mines shows quite a different result - that of poor correlation with diesel surrogates. This brings a question to the
above NIOSH conclusion and for the overall study results.
From the beginning, MARG scientists have disagreed with
NIOSH's initial choice of surrogate. If the sampled diesel
emission gasses cannot be correlated to diesel particulate
exposures, then confidence in historical exposure level
modeling is minimal.
This is the reason MARG is interested in sharing data, so
discrepancies such as this can be examined independently to
promote better research and conclusions. Hopefully, the
entire body of data from the in mine testing will provide
sufficient answers to these questions.

Morton/Fairport, Ohio (salt) - May 1998

CONCLUSIONS

Mississippi Lime, Illinois, Limestone- June, 1998 - Some
Employees refused to wear samplers due to safety. reasons.
The company had employees sign a form so NlOSH would
also give study results to them. Mississippi Lime was asked
to participate in the biomarker study. Some areas of the
mine were declared off-limits for trade secret purposes.
NIOSH complied with company requests except for distributing controversial stickers depicting diesel smoke and silica
until asked again to stop. The company will send all employees a letter notifying them of sampling results and asking permission to review their NIOSH provided results so
they can be compared to the MARG acquired data.
CargilL Avery Island, Louisiana, (Salt), July, 1998- The
company had a problem with employee records and may not
f)e usable for the study. NIOSH offered to come back in
winter to examine mine humidity effects. Cargill will also
do this independently. Cargill rubber-stamped NIOSH employee personal sample data cards so employees could sign
to give data to Cargill also.
General Chemical, Wyoming, (trona)- September, 1998
- General Chemical was able to utilize experience from
previous mines to acquire employee data from NIOSH. All
parties are becoming experienced and the study ran relatively smoothly.

MARG has been disappointed with the uncooperative nature
of NIOSH and NCI in attempting to establish an effective,
comprehensive protocol to study diesel exhaust in underground mines. An analysis of existing scientific studies
shows a slightly positive correlation with cancer, but not to
the degree voiced by NIOSH. Because of this slender margin, it is essential to perform the highest level of testing to
ascertain if there is such a correlation. MARG has sincerely
raised many important questions and offered alternatives to
move toward this goal with little acknowledgement or cooperation from NIOSH or NCI.
MARG believes that due to the inherent shortcomings of
the study protocol, primarily in utilizing poor science and
methodology, it will be impossible to determine with any
scientific confidence, that there is any relationship between
diesel exhaust and cancer in underground miners. It is a
shame to waste time and money on a tremendously important study when the outcome will be very much in doubt.
MSHA has gone ahead and promulgated diesel emissions
regulations for both Coal and Metal Non-Metal mines in
1998.
This was despite the fact that NIOSH is the research ann of
MSHA under Section 50 1(b) of The Act (MSM 1977) and
NIOSH has promoted the necessity for this study as justification for MSHA regulations (Silvennan, 1994). MSHA
has determined it is not necessary to wait for the results of
the NIOSH diesel study to promulgate regulations (fomb,
1998~ Federal Register, 1998).

FMC, Wyoming, (trona)- Scheduled first quarter, 1999
OCI, Wyoming, (trona)- Scheduled first quarter, 1999

DIESEL STUDY RESULTS
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A recent piece of legislation attached to the 1999 onmibus spending bill (Public Law 105-277) directs the White
House Office of Management and Budget to require that
agencies make underlying data from federally funded research available through the Freedom of Information Act It
has been MARG's contention all along that data sharing is
essential to have confirmation by independent sources of
federal research conclusions. Peer review is the accepted
method of confirm-ing research results in the scientific
community. Any reasonable individual would have to ask
why NIOSH has resisted sharing data from the start of the
Protocol development. MARG believes it is essential that
the data be analyzed concurrently so both parties can publish conclusions together.
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